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October 17, 2011

Africa’s business terrain a minefield of political agendas

IN AFRICA, where doing business often involves traversing a minefield of politics, concluding a deal around election time is not a good idea. Poor institutional structures mean there is undue emphasis on personal relationships. A change of a minister or even a top bureaucrat can mark the end of a carefully constructed business deal, contract or investment.

When both the president and the ruling party change, the risk factor escalates significantly.

Deals that have become stuck in the works often get freed up just as elections appear on the horizon. Incumbent politicians look to see what financial advantage they can get in case of an upset in the poll. Or they are diverted by their re-election ambitions and take their eye off the ball, allowing for some movement on deals that have been caught up in undue bureaucracy or lack of political will. But when the dust settles, contracts can be scrutinised and are sometimes found wanting — for the right or wrong reasons.

The reversal by Zambian President Michael Sata of ’s $5,4m deal to acquire local institution Finance Bank has resulted in much comment and criticism in SA. But it is fair to say that the banking group probably put too much faith in a system built on the shifting sands of politics.

There is no suggestion of impropriety by the company itself but the timing of the deal was high risk.

The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) had been in power since the end of the one-party state in 1991 — until Sata’s Patriotic Front, formed a decade later, won last month’s election.

Sata has lost to MMD candidates by slim margins several times. So it is no surprise that now he has won, dozens of politicians and bureaucrats aligned to the former ruling party have been shown the door.

An early casualty (besides FirstRand) was Caleb Fundanga, governor of the Bank of Zambia, which facilitated the sale of Finance Bank. Sata’s plan to change economic policy may be the reason for Fundanga’s removal — but it might equally be the fact that he is an MMD member and his wife stood for the party in the election (and lost).

It may also be linked to talk that Sata’s campaign was funded by Rajan Mahtani, Finance Bank’s majority shareholder before he was ousted by the Bank of Zambia, which has brought fraud charges against him over the way he acquired his shareholding. Mahtani, a friend of former president Levy Mwanawasa, is no stranger to politics.

Undisclosed interests that lie beneath local politics are one of the biggest risks of doing business anywhere. These include under-the-table business relationships that can influence policy in a way that undermines reform and promotes corruption by ensuring that local business empires are supported, even if this conflicts with the broader national interest. Given Africa’s developmental and operating challenges, this situation is more iniquitous here than in many other regions.

Many investors like to hitch their fortunes to presidents and ministers, despite the inherent risks this holds. While it may be good to build relationships with incumbent leaders, it can backfire. Companies may unknowingly fall foul of factions within the ruling party or of people whose political star may suddenly decline. This has all sorts of potentially negative consequences.

Nigeria’s late president, Umaru Yar’Adua, scrutinised and reversed a number of deals worth billions of dollars that had been pushed through by his predecessor, Olusegun Obasanjo. Richard Branson, who had close links to Obasanjo, found an investment contract that gave him operational preferences was reversed by Yar’Adua’s administration. Branson disinvested.

FirstRand is one of many casualties. The African business landscape is littered with contracts and deals that turned sour after a change of leadership, a sudden change of policy or the unexplained withdrawal of operating licences. Vested interests or politics generally underlie these failures.

But it is not just politicians that are at fault. Companies — both local and foreign — also have a role to play in breaking the cycle of patronage and other bad habits that undermine the performance of economies and the ability to operate on a level and predictable playing field in African countries.

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October 3, 2011

Africa scores new own goal in support for despot’s vanity project

EQUATORIAL Guinea is associated with many things — arbitrary detention, torture and killing of citizens, fraudulent elections and corruption. One thing it is not certainly associated with is a quest to improve the quality of human life. This makes the establishment of the Obiang Nguema Mbasogo International Prize for Research in the Life Sciences an oddity that hardly seems worth mentioning.

However, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) is taking it seriously. In 2008, Unesco agreed to back the prize in Obiang’s name and funded by him — despite an appalling human rights record.

Obiang’s plan was foiled last year when a storm of protest by human rights groups, anticorruption organisations and citizens led Unesco to suspend the award indefinitely.

Obiang is clearly trying to improve his international image.

At Unesco’s annual board meeting, which started last week, the issue popped up again, when 15 African states proposed lifting the suspension. Unsurprisingly, the group includes countries with less than exemplary human rights records themselves, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire and Republic of Congo, but also reforming countries such as Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana.

The truth is that Obiang is leveraging his chairmanship of the African Union (AU) to get support for his vanity project from states that should be distancing themselves from him. Not only did Obiang have his uncle executed to become president more than 30 years ago, his rule has been a brutal dictatorship and in effect a one- party affair despite the introduction of so-called multiparty elections in 1991. A small population and high oil revenue make the country’s per capita gross domestic product the highest in Africa, but the statistics mask rampant poverty. Oil-revenue spending lacks transparency and although the government applied to become part of the global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, it was turned down for failing to meet the entry criteria.

The oil-funded spending excesses enjoyed by the Obiang family are exemplified by the president’s son, Teodoro Obiang, minister of agriculture and international playboy.

A potential successor to the Obiang throne, the son reportedly splashed $10m on one spending spree in SA a few years ago, which makes the president’s $3m prize money piffling by family standards. Archbishop Desmond Tutu has been a vocal critic of Unesco’s consideration of the award and, last week, a critical article by him calling on the organisation to reject it appeared on several websites.

Although SA is not part of the African lobby at Unesco, President appears to be very interested in Equatorial Guinea. In 2009, he visited the country twice, the second time on a state visit following Obiang’s unsurprising election victory with 97% of the votes.

SA’s communique said the country was eager to promote relations in agriculture, mining, energy, tourism and infrastructure development, as well as the “strengthening of democracy on the continent”. But SA has limited trade with the country. Its biggest interest is through PetroSA, which is exploring for oil.

The fact that Obiang, who embodies Africa’s worst political excesses, is Africa’s representative-in-chief through his chairmanship of the A U – the same organisation that embraced Muammar Gaddafi as its head barely two years ago — diminishes the continent. Unesco, too, will be diminished if it caves in to the A U lobby. The $3m Obiang is putting into the award is small change for a man with an estimated net worth of $600m, but it will be very costly for the organisation in terms of its reputation and credibility if it approves the award.

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February 24, 2011

Political meddling may dash Zimbabwe’s growth hopes again

DOZENS of Zimbabwe’s business leaders attended the annual CEO Roundtable this past weekend to discuss how to create a R700bn economy by 2030. The CEO Roundtable blurb says that, at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s economy was worth about R42bn against SA’s then gross domestic product (GDP) of R567bn.

In 2009, SA’s GDP had risen to about R2,5-trillion while Zimbabwe’s is now estimated to be the same as it was 30 years ago.

The 2030 target is a large mountain to climb for an economy a long way off its peak. The government is nevertheless extremely bullish about the economy this year. The 2011 National Budget Statement puts economic growth last year at 8,1%, up from 5,7% in 2009, led by 47% growth in mining and 34% in agriculture.

The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe recently published optimistic economic forecasts. These included a doubling of tobacco output and large increases in production of sugar, maize and cotton. It also predicted mining growth of 44% this year.

New investment to the tune of R46bn to boost the ailing power infrastructure is on the cards as the sector opens up to private players — necessary to address the past decade’s serious de-industrialisation.

Tourist arrivals in the first three quarters of last year were nearly 800000, up from 533000 in 2009. Tourism officials in Livingstone, Zambia, which shares with Zimbabwe the region’s prime tourist attraction of Victoria Falls, concede they are losing tourists to their southern neighbour.

Export revenue doubled last year over the previous year — though, on the downside, so did foreign outflows, reflecting Zimbabwe’s import dependence and its underperforming manufacturing sector.

But looming political developments may arrest or reverse some of these gains. Most notable among these is the grinding up of Zanu (PF)’s election machinery following President Robert Mugabe’s statements that an election this year is unavoidable given the expiry of the government of national unity’s (GNU’s) two-year term. Mugabe has said he cannot extend the GNU for more than six months, after which elections must be held. But legal opinions suggest the GNU can govern until 2013 when, constitutionally, the next elections are scheduled — unless the parties agree to an earlier poll.

Already, heightened violence is being reported in rural and urban areas and rumours are surfacing of people being forced to pay for new Zanu (PF) party cards (essential for survival during an election).

There is also the question of missing diamond revenues. Finance Minister Tendai Biti has launched an inquiry into the whereabouts of R700m of diamond revenue earmarked for the Treasury, drawing fire from interested parties such as the state’s Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, which mined the diamonds with private operators.

Biti says the Treasury has received just R434m of the R1,2bn due to it, fuelling concern that Zanu (PF)’s control of the diamond fields, through the army and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, has allowed it to divert revenue to the party for its election campaign.

Zanu (PF)’s sanctions propaganda machine has also been busy, trying to bluff the world that sanctions are to blame for Zimbabwe’s economic collapse and its slow recovery.

Political uncertainty and heightened investment risk emanating from Zanu (PF)’s indigenisation drive, which remains opaque in application and dominated by nationalistic rhetoric, is at the forefront here.

The weekend’s CEO Roundtable had its work cut out to devise ways for Zimbabwe to reach the 15% growth rate required to reach the proposed 2030 target. The country has a fighting chance only if the politicians pull back from their interference in the economy and its key assets.

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February 7, 2011

SA cannot count on being the ‘gateway to Africa’ forever

A COLLEAGUE who flew in from Zimbabwe last week complained about his reception in SA. He said there was poor signage to the Gautrain, his chosen cellphone provider said it would take 24 hours to register his line, by which time he would have left SA, and a currency exchange bureau said his chosen US dollar notes were too dirty to exchange. Nothing life-threatening, but rather disappointing, he said, because SA sold itself as a world-class destination, raising expectations that one would not have on visiting other countries in the region.

A Zambian accompanying him wryly noted the signs erected above potholed roads proclaiming Johannesburg to be a world-class city. Africans from other countries often comment on what they feel is SA’s rather smug opinion of itself as an exception in Africa, based on its sophisticated economy and good infrastructure.

This opinion is bolstered by the country’s occupation of Africa’s exclusive seat on the Group of 20, its preferred candidacy for any permanent African seat on the United Nations Security Council and now the invitation to join the emerging-country Bric club (Brazil, Russia, India, China).

There is some resentment about SA’s tendency to assume, unasked, the position of the continent’s spokesman and, as a recent article said rather grandly, “the advocate of the African cause in the shifting sands of global economic power and institutional reform”.

Africans from other countries argue that SA’s leadership role has been created by countries and organisations from outside the continent rather than by African countries themselves. The political gateway concept raises questions about whether SA is also the business gateway to the continent by dint of its “exceptionalism”.

It is undisputed that SA has the most diversified and sophisticated economy on the continent, with the largest private sector, biggest capital base, world-class legal and commercial systems, air links to many African countries, political stability, relative competitiveness, strong regulation and other positives. The World Cup showcased SA’s considerable strengths.

Many top global companies run their Africa offices out of SA, the JSE is the financial centre of the continent and the country is a logistics and transport hub for its hinterland.

And it is not only foreign multinationals that have set up in SA. A number of African companies have migrated here, not just for the ease of doing business but also for lifestyle reasons. The lights come on when you flick a switch, water comes out of the taps, the road network is sound, there are good private schools and hospitals, world-class restaurants and good book shops. International companies can persuade top people to run African operations because they can offer them a soft landing in Africa.

A draw for foreign companies is also access to South African companies on the continent with a strong African footprint.

But while SA may have had the historical advantage of being a business gateway, this is rapidly being eroded by developments elsewhere, particularly as logistics and geography start to play a greater role in international business.

Nigeria is an economic hub for West Africa, Angola is a key point of contact for companies from Brazil and Portugal and those in the oil game, while Kenya and Mauritius are drawcards for Asian companies and offshore financial interests.

Dubai is growing its African ties, particularly through the expansion of flights to African cities, while London and Paris remain the headquarters for many multinationals with African interests. Even the tiny island state of Cape Verde is developing itself as a logistical transhipment point for northwest Africa.

SA has not capitalised sufficiently on its proximity to the rest of Africa and has failed to balance its continental interests with its quest for advantage in developed economies and non- African emerging markets.

Its official engagement with the rest of Africa has been ad hoc and unfocused. SA, unlike many other investing countries on the continent, has no economic strategy for its hinterland and even its political clout has been tempered by a lot of fence-sitting on difficult issues.

SA cannot afford to rest on its laurels, even as it celebrates its impending ascension as a member of Bric. It is losing traction in many African markets due to rising competition, and has mounting governance challenges at home. The days of “exceptionalism” are rapidly coming to an end.

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November 4, 2010

Aiming for economic growth in Africa where it matters most

THE mood in Tunis last week was upbeat. The African Development Bank annual conference was a celebration of Africa’s resilience in the face of the global meltdown.

The tone of the meeting was reflected in bank president Donald Kaberuka’s opening speech. “An unusually strong momentum has built up in Africa over the past decade.” Although the mood about the continent was not yet “Afro-ebullient”, it was certainly not the “Afropessimism of the 1990s”, he said.

The note of optimism at the event in the African Development Bank’s home base, Tunisia, was buoyed by the release of an International Monetary Fund report earlier this month. The report predicted that continental gross domestic product (GDP) growth for this year would be 5% — double last year’s dismal 2,5%. It further predicted higher growth next year.

As the resources boom thunders on, growth in secondary sectors, such as telecommunications, services and retail, is helping to lift growth and make it more sustainable, delegates at the conference heard.

Remittance flows also survived the global crisis, despite dire predictions that there would be an enormous contraction in line with shrinking jobs in the developed world.

Interestingly, this was attributed to high levels of remittance flows within Africa itself, a fact that highlights the disaggregated nature of African development, which continental growth figures tend to obscure.

But when the dust settled at the conference, there was more sober discussion of the considerable economic and social challenges that will not be erased by higher growth.

Kaberuka himself voiced concern about maintaining the growth trajectory after a large energy infrastructure deficit. Speakers raised the perennial problem of agriculture.

Africa is exporting every commodity in large volumes, except food. It is a continent that still cannot feed itself and now it faces the spectre of climate change, fuelled (many believe) by the very resources driving growth.

Trade barriers, which have little to do with infrastructure and everything to do with the dead hand of bureaucracy and graft, are persistent.

Goods take three weeks to get from Mombasa port to the factory gate in Nairobi, for example. Intra-African trade remains about a quarter of intra- Asian trade. Intra-African investment, too, is low — about 3%, compared with about 30% in Asia. Gains in domestic resource mobilisation are in danger of being undermined by illicit capital outflows from many countries.

Savings are almost nonexistent, small companies — the backbone of Africa’s economies — struggle to grow, and spending on science and technology is less than 1% of GDP across the continent, hampering innovation and value addition.

 Predictions of another decade or two of growth will be compromised if structural transformation of African economies does not take place. It may simply entrench inefficiencies and policy weakness.

 Nigeria’s central bank governor, Lamido Sanusi, who also spoke at the event, highlighted a central problem. “The good growth we are seeing is predicated on growth in other parts of the world. How long can we rely on their growth for us to grow?”

The danger is that new revenues from resources, if not properly harnessed, may end up plugging revenue gaps, in the same way aid has done, rather than providing a catalyst for broad-based growth.

China was on the African Development Bank menu last week, and the debate seemed to be unchanged from that of five years ago — how can African countries negotiate a deal with the Chinese to ensure long-term benefits for the continent? Apparently we have still not figured this out.

African countries are still grappling with fundamental issues, such as how to build a sustainable tax base and how to make microfinance effective.

And then there is the usual problem of politics. Self-interest and rent- seeking by politicians in policy implementation and prioritisation is a curse that continues to dog the continent. Sanusi reflected that Nigeria had achieved 7% growth despite — not because of — government policies.

Africa, as a continent, is undoubtedly on an upward trajectory and there are marked improvements in many states, such as Ghana. But it is too soon to celebrate.

Economic growth statistics mask the vulnerability and skewed sectoral performance of many countries. This is particularly true of resource- based states that are contributing in large measure to the continent’s overall growth figures.

As one delegate said: “We want to know that when we see growth in services in Africa, that is about IT, financial services and tourism — not an increase in the number of miserable fellows selling oranges in the traffic.”

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October 13, 2010

Water on troubled oil

With one phone call to her husband in the Niger Delta in 2008, SA-based Azuka Okah managed to secure the release of two South African divers kidnapped for ransom by rebels in Nigeria’s oil producing region. 

 Azuka Okah moved to SA with her four children in 2007 when her husband Henry, leader of Nigerian rebel group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), was detained by the Nigerian authorities on 63 charges that included sabotage, robbery, hostage taking and possession of arms.

She argued for the release of the SA men on the basis that her family had been well treated in their new home in the country.

In October Henry Okah, who was released from jail in Nigeria in 2009 under an amnesty negotiated with the government, was in court again – this time in SA, where he has joined his family. He appeared on charges of terrorism linked to the bombings in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, during the country’s 50th independence anniversary celebrations on Friday.

Original reports said MEND had claimed responsibility for the bombings. It is no stranger to planting bombs in the delta and even at an installation in the commercial capital, Lagos.

But Okah has claimed no knowledge of the blasts and the government has accused criminal elements of hiding behind the Niger Delta rebel group.

President Goodluck Jonathan, then vice president, was the main negotiator in the 2009 ceasefire agreement with MEND, in terms of which the state promised immunity from prosecution for all gunmen who laid down their weapons over a 60-day period ending in October last year.

One of MEND’s key ceasefire demands was the release of their leader – Okah – from jail, which was met soon after the talks were concluded.

Jonathan has a major stake in peace in the Niger Delta, particularly given that it is likely to be a key campaign issue for him in his fight to stand for president in the 2011 elections.

 MEND, which has been waging war against the government and the international oil companies for the past five years, has been responsible for many instances of kidnapping of foreigners in the Niger Delta in its quest to get funding for its activities and publicity for its cause.

 The organisation is the most prominent of many militant groups formed since oil was discovered in Nigeria in the late 1950s who have been fighting for a stake in Nigeria’s significant oil reserves which are located in the Niger Delta in south-east Nigeria.

Nigeria is Africa’s biggest oil producer and the commodity accounts for 95% of the country’s foreign reserves and about 80% of its revenues.

In the 1970s, the government nationalised oil assets and the nine states that make up the Niger Delta currently receive revenues from the central government as part of a revenue sharing agreement with the 36 states that make up the federation.

But their share in no way reflects the proportion of revenues that are generated from the area and it remains one of the poorest parts of the country for ordinary people. Development promises by the past administration of Olusegun Obasanjo were not kept, fuelling resentment among delta people.

Activities by oil companies over the years have left the environment degraded through oil spills and gas flaring.  

Media images of MEND are pure theatre  – heavily muscled men with balaclavas and automatic weapons riding the waters of the Niger Delta in speed boats.

But the waterways of the delta have been a theatre of war, not the scene of an action movie. Since MEND was formed in 2005, its members have launched dramatic attacks on oil installations in the area, affecting production, costing Nigeria about R200m a day in lost revenues since 2006.

This has not only affected the revenues of the central government and profit margins of the oil companies, it has affected global oil supplies and helped to push up prices. As Nigeria imports most of its fuel needs because of a lack of refining capacity, Nigerian consumers are affected too.

The Niger Delta is a vast area of south-east Nigeria characterised by swamps, rivers, creeks, estuaries and thick mangrove forest, making it a difficult landscape to fight any kind of insurgency. Okah’s message, conveyed by the media, was clear: “We control the oil and there is nothing the government can do about it.”

The area is home to a number of minority ethnic groups, such as the Ijaw, who have never been near the seat of power in Nigeria until Jonathan’s sudden ascendancy to the presidency earlier this year after the death of his predecessor, Umar Yar’Adua.

Yar’Adua chose Jonathan, a former governor of Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta, as his vice president with a view to tackling the Niger Delta insurgency. But even Jonathan found it difficult to make headway with MEND and other militant groups that had surfaced in the delta over the years.

The scenario of government versus militants has become increasingly complex and, importantly, monetised. Oil bunkering — theft of refined oil through pipeline sabotage — has become big business for militants. Payment for protection of assets, companies and people has created new political and economic fiefdoms and little of the money going into rebel coffers appears to be going to the development of communities whose lives the rebels claim to want to improve.

The rebel activity is becoming increasingly interlinked with rising criminality and kidnappings for ransom have spread to other parts of the country with no direct links to the Niger Delta issue.

In 2009, the federal government launched a major military offensive on rebel activity in the delta and several months later, agreement was reached on the ceasefire and amnesty for rebel fighters.  

But in early 2010, MEND, frustrated by the lack of progress of talks with government because of the Yar’Adua’s serious illness, said its war against the oil industry would resume.  

This has not happened but the ceasefire is on shaky ground as economic opportunities for former rebels are not being created fast enough. Huge investment in the region is required to meet promises to reintegrate them.

Despite – and because of – their massive oil and gas riches, the delta states have suffered from years of corruption, underdevelopment and infrastructural neglect. The turnaround is going to be long, slow and expensive.

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October 13, 2010

Oil is a far cry from being Africa’s curse

THERE is no African oil curse, maintains global oil and gas expert Dr Duncan Clarke, only an inherited and continuing curse of politics. Responding to the frequently cited “curse” theory that is linked to Africa’s natural resources, Clarke says: “The oil industry already contributes in huge measure to continent-wide economic growth and investment partnerships with the state and its national oil companies, and acts as a pillar of corporate governance in Africa. The misuse of oil revenues, where it exists, is a government matter, not a corporate one. “Corporate ‘nannies’ and the Mother Theresa complex will not fix the malfeasance of some of Africa’s politicians: only Africans can do that,” he says in his typically outspoken and combative style.

 Clarke, chairman of Global Pacific & Partners, has spent more than 40 years travelling across Africa and has, so far, visited 45 of the continent’s 53 states to keep tabs on the oil and gas game that is his company’s core business.

With resources now in the global limelight, his knowledge and observations of Africa’s peculiar problems and challenges make him a key commentator on the complex issues of this industry. Africa’s oil industry dates back to the mid-1950s, when oil was discovered in the Niger Delta and the Maghreb. In the late 1980s Africa had about 60- billion barrels of proven oil reserves. Today, Africa-wide oil reserves stand at about 120- billion barrels, Clarke says.

Global Pacific & Partners covers a wide range of information disciplines including global oil and gas research, advisory services, strategy briefings and contributions to oil and gas media. Clarke is based in its Johannesburg office and the company also has operating offices in The Hague and London and a representative in Rio de Janeiro for Latin American business.

Clarke is also an adviser to African governments and oil companies, and the company runs the continent’s largest oil and gas events, such as Africa Oil Week, now in its 17th year, which comes up in November.

The third edition of his book, Africa, Crude Continent: The Struggle for Africa’s Oil Prize, was released in SA last week and television channel CNBC- Africa is airing a documentary based on the book, examining developments in the African oil industry.

The book, which looks at a century of oil in Africa and related issues, was first published in 2008 but the epilogue has been updated to tackle what he says are “public and media myths about the continent and its complex oil game”. Among the issues tackled is the commonly held perception of Africa’s riches being its “curse”. Clarke uses the example of Equatorial Guinea, which was a venal, antidemocratic state before oil was found. “The politicians have introduced a facade of democratic governance and when this is found wanting, oil is targeted as the cause.”

Africa, Crude Continent also raises new questions about some foreign state oil companies, notably players from China, given the emergence of what he calls the “Chinafrique” model.

 This is not Clarke’s first tome on the oil and gas world. In 2007 he wrote his first book, The Battle for Barrels — a critique of the theory that the world is running out of oil. “The production peak is some decades away at least.”

He says rising prices, new technologies, improved exploration and access to restricted world oil zones, as well as changes in government policy and corporate strategy, are pointers to the unlikelihood of the world running out of oil anytime soon.

Clarke has spent most of his professional life focused on the world’s oil and gas business and says it is arguably one of the hardest things to understand and measure, let alone predict with precision — despite the fact that many try to do so.

“The oil sector’s history teaches many lessons, the failure of forecasting being one of them. It also instructs us about human ingenuity and adaptability. Like the weather, the oil industry could take many unexpected turns in future.”

His second book was Empires of Oil: Corporate Oil in Barbarian Worlds .It examined the rise of resource nationalism and the issues confronting companies about the future.

Clarke, who comes from Zimbabwe, began his career teaching economics and advising institutions and business clients about Africa. While working in Geneva in 1978, he was doing extensive work on the continent for private companies, governments and multilateral agencies and was asked to work on the oil industry, which, in those Cold War days, was of particular interest.  He established Global Pacific & Partners in 1988 to build on the global experience acquired through his consulting and economic research work with various clients.

 “We’re constantly monitoring the industry and selective specifics. I’m in the process of something that will come to market probably late next year or in 2012, about the African continent, a new book that will be wider than oil and gas.

“It will be about interpreting Africa’s economic past, present and future, and looking at it through our models which we’ve worked with for over 40 years. There’s still great ambiguity about actually understanding how Africa came to be what it is today, and indeed much contestation.

“This has huge implications. Only by understanding what’s actually taken place can one hope to shape models to best develop the African world. This is something that I think is lacking, and I’ve been working on it for some years,” he says.

Clarke maintains the oil and gas landscape is changing fast. More companies enter the continent each year, and investment commitments and numbers of projects executed are rising. Exploration is also increasing, he says, and, in turn, new oil discoveries.  

These include significant oil finds in Uganda, Ghana and Sierra Leone and in other states around the continent. There are also new discoveries in older oil and gas markets such as Nigeria and Angola.

“I think competition will intensify over time as more players compete and the foreign state oil companies add to the overall portfolio.”

Clarke says increasingly, African players are becoming more prominent in the sector and as a result a greater foreign- local partnership matrix is evolving. “African private oil companies now number over 100 and come from 20 countries — a far cry from a decade ago.”

 The future growth area is gas. He says with 500-trillion cubic feet of gas now proven in Africa, the continent’s total hydrocarbon reserves stand at about 250-billion barrels of oil equivalent. “The future for gas is very strong, with more reserve growth, discoveries and markets being developed, as well as exports to Europe and within Africa,” Clarke says.

However, Africa will remain a net exporter of both oil and gas for the next couple of decades, he predicts, as the continent is moving slowly in terms of beneficiation.

 And what about the future of the planet, given the much touted theory that carbons are the cause of global warming?

“The claimed global carbon crisis, with oil as derivative culprit, is a greatly oversold type of anti-oil politics, without sufficient anthropogenic causality. Africa would be wise to avoid buying into its proponents’ policy mandates, economic distortions, and the huge costs it would impose with related implications for the continent’s 1-billion inhabitants.”

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October 4, 2010

Niger Delta: Building a new city alongside the old

In Nigeria’s colonial era, the city of Port Harcourt was favoured by the British rulers as a place to live because of its balmy weather, extensive gardens, sound infrastructure and access to the Atlantic Ocean. By 2010, the city, one of the fastest growing in Africa and the second biggest in southern Nigeria after Lagos, has become the epitome of unchecked urbanization that has swamped the neat colonial planning and spilled over the edges onto outlying villages.

Named after former British secretary of state for the colonies, Lord Lewis Harcourt, the city was built to accommodate 5 000 people when it was founded in 1913 as a port to export coal.

Today, the capital of Rivers State in the Niger Delta and the de facto capital of Nigeria’s oil producing region area, houses an estimated two million people.  

Nigerian lawyer, Dame Aleruchi Cookey-Gam, has taken on the tough job of driving an initiative to build a new city in Port Harcourt alongside the old as a legacy project for the future. She gave up a career in law to help the governor of Rivers State, Rotimi Amaechi, realize his dream of building a world-class city from the urban sprawl he inherited.

Cookey-Gam, the former state Attorney General, says although the project to build a new city is ambitious, it is necessary if Port Harcourt is to have a decent future.  

She is the Administrator of the Greater Port Harcourt City Development Authority (GPHCDA), inaugurated last year as a legal entity to provide the legal and regulatory framework for the development, reducing the risk of any policy reversal by future administrations. 

The planned new city, a multibillion dollar, 50-year initiative, will adjoin the old city, which is slowly being restructured, to form one large urban entity.

The Rivers State government is funding Greater Port Harcourt to the tune of $2.5bn and the remainder of the financing is being sought from foreign investors and international funding institutions. The state is home to a large chunk of Nigeria’s oil wealth and 60% of the country’s foreign direct investment is concentrated there.

Phase one of the project includes development of a university of science and technology, a 1 000 bed hospital, a sports village, a central business district, 3 000 residential units, a light commercial and industrial area and a golf course.

Cookey Gam is in SA with a team from the GPHCDA to seek collaboration, partnerships and funding. Although the visit was primarily to attend the Planning Africa 2010 conference and exhibition in Durban this month, the eThekewini Council also hosted a one-day investment forum focused specifically on the investment opportunities in the Port Harcourt project ahead of the event.

Cookey Gam has spent a good deal of her time lately travelling around the world to push the initiative forward but SA remains a key port of call.

South African companies are in prime position to land contracts to the value of about R2bn for the New City development. The Port Harcourt project is being done in partnership with SA engineering design company Arcus Gibb in SA and the city has a twinning agreement with eThekwini, which is training 30 Nigerian state officials.

SA is a key source of investment, contractors, suppliers and services for projects in Nigeria, one of the fastest growing markets in Africa. The oil giant is one of SA’s biggest trading partners and its biggest investment destination in West Africa. SA exports to Nigeria increased from R550m in 1999 to R5.4bn in 2009 and dozens of South African companies are now operational there.

A lawyer by profession, Cookey-Gam qualified at the University of Ife in Nigeria in 1980 and did a Masters degree at the London School of Economics, entering legal practice in 1982. She took on the somewhat daunting job of Attorney General of Rivers State and Commissioner of Justice for four years from 1999.

Her stint in government began as Nigeria moved out of the shadow of military rule and into a democratic era under the leadership of then president, Olusegun Obasanjo.

After another stint in private practice, she was called back to the public service, this time by the new governor, Amaechi, who is often described as “a man in a hurry”. Amaechi has been driving many large legacy projects in the state, effectively using oil money to build non-oil assets. The Greater Port Harcourt city is one of them.

Cookey-Gam says an estimated 10% to 20% of the city is actually planned, with the rest developing through unchecked urbanization over the past few decades.

According to land records, in the mid-1970s – the beginning of the oil boom in Nigeria – the built up area of the city covered 17.4km². Twenty years later the urban area covered nearly 90km².

She describes Port Harcourt as the “jewel in Nigeria’s crown”, saying the old garden city, as it used to be known, needs to be reawakened. “We are an economic hub for the region and the numbers of people migrating here continue to grow so we need to take control of the city.”

“Even though we have oil and high levels of foreign investment here, we need to look beyond oil and focus on the long-term future of the state.”

The near collapse of the national electricity grid means many non-oil industries have closed down and the state has been forced to spend heavily on providing power in the Port Harcourt area to attract business.

The security situation has also been tackled head on, not just by Rivers State but by all the states in the Niger Delta, which have recognized the impediment rebel activity and crime present for future growth.

“We need to create a modern business node that will accelerate economic growth and development, supported by the appropriate economic policies and good governance. In turn these objectives will attract private sector interest, involvement and investment in infrastructure, housing, retail, offices and other commercial facilities.”

The key anchors in the new city will be the old city, the Port Harcourt International Airport and the Onne Harbour, which is an oil and gas free zone.

Although Cookey-Gam believes, like most Nigerians, much still needs to be done in her country in terms of governance, she says the democratic system is settling down and the politicians are recognising the need to bring on board private expertise.

Addressing the issue of security that surrounds any mention of the Niger Delta, Cookey Gam says, “Security is being addressed aggressively at a national and at a state level and the states are working together to improve security across the region.”

She also emphasized that corruption was being tackled. “Transparency and accountability are key to the Port Harcourt project. The governor himself is driving the adherence to sound corporate governance principles to give investors comfort.”

Governor Amaechi is a strong proponent of public-private partnerships to realize his vision for the state, which is focused on the big picture rather than simply on day-to-day concerns. “He is planning for the needs of tomorrow,” she says.

She says co-operation between the public and private sectors is key to development. “The government must regulate the economy and the system to ensure things work well and create the economic environment for the private sector to thrive. It is a symbiotic relationship that must be cultivated and nurtured at all times.”

“If government is a problem, the private sector feels the brunt of that. If government is good, the private sector benefits.”

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October 4, 2010

Zimbabwe: Potential investors still waiting on Mugabe’s demise

IT SEEMS that potential investors looking at Zimbabwe are hoping for a signal that they can safely rush into the so-called El Dorado of riches and opportunity.

South African business people thronged yet another conference on the future of Zimbabwe last week, this one hosted by The Economist magazine, seemingly in search of a new piece of information that will magically open an investment door for them.

It was not to be. The same old debates swirled around the room and issues were raised that have been aired at many similar events over the years. The familiar message was that not enough has changed in Zimbabwe to get a critical mass of people to part with their money just yet.

Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and his team did their best to persuade the audience that change has in fact happened, saying impatience from outside the country over the pace of positive developments has obscured exactly how much has changed.

The economy has stabilised, currency risk has been removed with the introduction of the dollar and rand for transactions, inflation is low, there are medicines in the hospitals, food in the supermarkets and water in the taps. Energy problems are being addressed through rehabilitation of and investment in capacity, investment processes are being streamlined and old laws are being reviewed.

But the issue for investors is not what has changed, but what has not — the “elephant in the room” as Tsvangirai described it. “As we speak, everyone is preoccupied with what he is doing and what he is thinking.”

The reality is that no one outside Zimbabwe will believe things have changed for the better until President Robert Mugabe steps down.

Tsvangirai said many Zimbabweans would like justice meted out to Mugabe for the depredations he has visited on his country, but an “eye for an eye might leave Zimbabwe blind”. Reconciliation is a tough balancing act for the man who is trying to rebrand Zimbabwe while all the while fighting “Brand Mugabe”.

And the truth is that political risk is still an important factor. Mugabe’s Zanu (PF) party remains a toxic force. It is out of touch with modern needs and exists in a political vacuum, relying on crude propaganda and constant reference to liberation- era glories to keep itself afloat.

Even as Tsvangirai tried to defend his old foe, saying many perceptions about Mugabe were misplaced, Zanu (PF) was busy undermining the unity government arrangement. 

Zanu (PF) was not represented at last week’s conference, but its propaganda machine was at work. Party chairman and Zimbabwe’s ambassador to SA, Simon Moyo, placed an advert in The Star to remind people that Zanu (PF) had liberated Zimbabwe “from the shackles of colonialism and settlerism”. His political rant included a sideswipe at Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC): “Offshoot political parties will remain offshoot, offside and scoring own goals.” It was a stark reminder of the reality faced by Zimbabweans fighting for change.

Mugabe’s removal is a necessary, but not sufficient, lever of change. His potential successors are old guard politicians with poor records. The MDC itself has internal problems and is still not taken seriously by all countries in the region.

There are other investor concerns, such as the indigenisation regulations that have yet to be finalised; contradictory policy statements from politicians on either side of the divide; no resolution on the future of the currency; and general Zanu (PF)-inspired rot in the system. 

Most importantly, there is uncertainty about the process leading up to, and the likely result of, next year’s election that will end the transition phase. So investors continue to sit on the fence, waiting for that signal. But it might be worth asking why Zimbabwe is regarded as a special investment case? South African investors are going into other countries with big problems, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Angola, where the risks are more insidious and the operating environment more opaque. 

Perhaps investors need to take a step back from the emotionalism and sentimentality that characterises analysis of Zimbabwe and compare it dispassionately with other investment opportunities in Africa.

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September 12, 2010

Port Harcourt Investment Forum

The Port Harcourt Investment Forum was held at the ICC in Durban on 10 September 2010. It was hosted by the eThekwini Council and the Greater Port Harcourt City Development Authority to publicise opportunities in the development of a new city in the Niger Delta.

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